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The politics of international
migratory regimes: transit




Among the features distinguishing the demogra-
phy of the modern world from its predecessors
are the types and patterns of international
migration. For instance, international migratory
flows directed to the European countries tend
to include a significant proportion of migrants
who first come to the peripheral zones of Eur-
ope, such as Eastern Eur-
ope, Western Asia, or
Northern Africa, intending
to enter Europe from those
areas. The changing charac-
ter of human mobility from
developing countries to Eur-
ope has profound conse-
quences for the politics of
international migration and
for the distribution of power
between countries touched
by various forms of
migrations.
It is within this context
that the high level of transit
migration flows around Europe in the last two
decades has been one of the most hotly debated
items on national and international agendas. For
instance in the early 1990s, when it was found
that many migrants from Asia, Africa, the
Middle East and the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS) passed through peripheral
zones on their way to Western Europe, the
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
decided to focus the first efforts of its Migration
Information Programme on analysing this issue.
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The result is a series of reports on transit
migration in several countries such as Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia,
Ukraine, and Turkey.1 In the second half of
the 1990s, the issue of transit migration around
Europe was debated in several international
meetings,2 and immigration debates in Europe
still reflect the importance of the issue.
This article explores the ways in which
transit migration flows are associated with the
politics of international
migration. It takes a careful
look at the politics of inter-
national migratory regimes
(IMRs), interpreting the
word ‘regime’ very loosely
to mean a regulatory system
which operates in certain
interests and distributes
powers and advantages or
disadvantages. It argues that
the globalisation of human
mobility has helped to
extend international migra-
tory movements in a form
of international regulatory
system. It also argues that recent patterns of
change in human mobility are outcomes of quite
complex interactions, with simultaneous and
sequential operation of a variety of interacting
factors. These include characteristics of the
migrants themselves, of the society they enter,
and of the society they leave. Looking at transit
migration flows and their associations with
IMRs opens a number of questions about the
relationship between migration movements and
the socio-political background, since IMRs are
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essentially political outcomes or compromises
which both reflect and shape global mobility
change.
The case study for the present analysis is
Turkey, a particularly appropriate country for
such inquiry because of its long established
attachment to the European IMRs. It should be
noted that not all aspects of transit migration
are analysed here. For our present purposes,
some basic characteristics of transit movements
suffice to define an international migratory
regime. While referring to the dynamics and
mechanisms of transit migration in Turkey, we
focus on four main dimensions that describe an
international migratory regime: level and pattern
over time, origins of flows, places of desti-
nation, and characteristics of migrants.
Background
Turkey has been a main actor in international
transit migratory movements for the last two
decades (Gokdere 1994, 49; Ic¸duygu 1996a,
128; IOM 1995, 1). Thousands of migrants,
with the intention to stay temporarily, have
come there from countries as diverse as Iraq,
Egypt, Morocco, Ghana, and Afghanistan, often
to find their way to the developed countries in
the west and north. There are three factors that
seem to be shaping these migratory movements
to Turkey. First, the ongoing political turmoil
and clashes occurring in neighbouring areas
have pushed people from their homelands in
the hope of a better life, security and protection
from persecution. Second, Turkey’s geographi-
cal location between East and West, and South
and North, has made the country a suitable
transit zone for those intending to reach western
and northern countries. Third, the policies of
‘Fortress Europe’, applying very restrictive
admission procedures and increasing immi-
gration controls, have diverted immigration
flows targeting Europe to peripheral zones
around it, like Turkey.
Since the early 1960s the relationship of
Western European countries with Turkey has
been intertwined with the high profile of
migration. The labour migration of the 1960s
and 1970s and the family reunification of the
1980s led to the formation of an established
migration regime between Europe and Turkey.
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In the 1990s it has been dominated by the
transit migration and asylum issues (Kirisci
1994, ZFT 1996). Again in the 1990s the Euro-
pean Union took the lead in the formulation of a
new migration and asylum regime. The asylum
regime has changed from a liberal one
implementing a selective but integrative policy
of access and full status recognition, with com-
plete social rights and long-term settlement, to
one maximising exclusion on entry, undermin-
ing status and rights, and with the perspective
of a short stay (Joly 1998).
A ‘comprehensive’ approach prioritises
action outside EU reception countries to provide
help in situ, and to settle potential asylum seek-
ers in countries as close as possible to the
region of origin. This is implemented through
readmission agreements and ‘safe third country’
resolutions (Joly 1996). The process is likely to
have a strong impact on migration from, to and
through Turkey (Ic¸duygu 1995).
The immigration and refugee crisis domin-
ating the agendas of Europe and Turkey since
the early 1990s continues as a hot debate on
what should be done with transit migrants and
refugees. With this background, this essay
investigates transit migration and refugee flows
in Turkey, evaluates the wider context of the
formulation of migration, asylum and refugee
regimes between Turkey and Europe, and
relates the issue of transit migration to the ongo-
ing dynamics of globalisation.
There is a widely accepted typology of
i ternational migration which consists of six
main types of migrants (Appleyard 1991, 1995):
(1) permanent settlers, (2) temporary contract
workers, (3) temporary professional employees,
(4) clandestine or illegal workers, (5) asylum
seekers, and (6) refugees. To this typology,
another category may be added, these are the
transit migrants, who are the people who come
to a country of destination with the intention
of going to and staying in another country.
From the beginning it is necessary to remind
ourselves that although the transit migrants are
usually associated with specific migratory con-
text, they often occur within a web of other
types of migration. For instance, clandestine or
illegal workers, asylum seekers, refugees and
transit migrants often overlap. In other words,
the category of transit migrants consists of a
mixture of various types of migrants. Therefore,
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the concept of transit migration must be con-
structed according to a typology which recog-
nises not only the intention of migrants but also
the dynamics and mechanisms of the whole
migration process.
While a great deal of research attention
has been paid to various types of international
migration, there has been very little consistent
research done on the issue of transit migration
in an international context (Ic¸duygu 1996a,
IOM, UNHCR, and OSCE 1996). Study of the
various types of migration could, of course,
yield leads and insights about transit migration,
but the types of international migratory move-
ments are hardly the same. It is obvious that
we need to know more than we do about the
transit migratory movement, which involves
particular structures and processes. We also
need to know about the social, economic, and
political characteristics of the sending, hosting,
and receiving countries involved.
From a theoretical perspective, three points
should be made. First, it is important to the
understanding of the migratory process in its
totality, including the links between the various
stages of the transit migratory process, such as
pre-migratory background, physical transition,
and resettlement. Second, one should look at
migration from a historical perspective. Third,
one needs to locate and conceptualise the pos-
ition of individual migrants within the totality.
In the vast and diverse literature on inter-
national migration and migrants, theoretical and
empirical studies can be grouped into four
major research areas: the origins of migratory
flow, the determinants of their stability over
time, the uses of migrant labour, and the adap-
tation of migrants into the receiving society
(Portes and Bach 1985, 3; Portes and Borocz
1985, 606). Generally speaking, the causes of
migration are at the centre of attention in the
first two areas, while the focus is on conse-
quences in the following two areas (Morokvasic
1984, 17). The subject on transit migration
brings together causes and consequences. Their
close interaction is revealed by the role of the
transit migrants themselves. They are not
merely subjects whose moves are determined
by structural factors. They are also actors who
formulate their own strategies and life projects
in their societies of origin and reception, which
they in turn modify (Joly 1998).
 UNESCO 2000.
It is widely argued that contemporary
migratory flows contribute to changing mean-
ings of concepts such as nation, state, nation-
state, citizenship, multiculturalism, residence,
nationality, community, identity and social
relationships resulting from globalisation
(Içduygu 1996b, 150). Today, the migration
regimes of nation-states, which were to a large
extent framed by the state-centric logic of the
Cold War, are becoming problematic and inef-
fective, as migration flows are becoming many-
layered and not easily controlled by individual
states. Consequently, migration flows are often
seen as a potential security threat, and figure
largely in discourse on national and inter-
national security (Ic¸duygu and Keyman 1998,
Kirisci 1994).
Turkey provides an illustrative case, where
the nation-state lacks an effective migration pol-
icy, and is very much affected by the immi-
gration and asylum policies and practices of
European countries. Turkey also constitutes an
ideal case-study, because of both its high rate
of emigration and its experience of refugee
flows and transit migration (Ic¸duygu and Key-
man 1998).
Transit migration in Turkey3
Official statistics, based on data compiled by
the State Institute of Statistics in Turkey, show
that over the last 20 years (1979 to 1999) more
than 55 million foreigners arrived in Turkey.
Most of these arrivals were tourists who were
travelling for recreation, holiday, family visit,
business and similar purposes, but some were
persons intending to settle in Turkey tempor-
arily or permanently. There were also transit
people who came with the intention of going
to and staying in a third country. There is no
reliable categorisation of arrivals in the official
statistics, nor a clear indication of the levels of
the different types of migratory flow. However,
it is clear that since the early 1980s there has
been a sharp increase in the movement of fore-
igners into Turkey.
Slightly more than a quarter of the 55
million foreigners who entered the country
between 1979 and 1999, did so in the first ten
years of that period. The remaining three-quar-
ters arrived in the second decade. In other
360 Ahmet Içduygu
words, the number of foreigners arriving in Tur-
key was tripled in the period of 1989–1999.
Besides the increasing numbers of the arrivals
in the context of tourism, possibly there was
an intensifying movement of people who desire
to settle in Turkey or who want go from Turkey
to a third country.
To better understand the transit phenom-
enon in Turkey, it is necessary to refer to recent
refugee flows into the country.4 The movement
of refugees is not the same as that of other
transients, but information on the former may
cast light on the latter. Although Turkey was
one of the signatories of the 1951 Geneva Con-
vention, it accepted the Convention with a geo-
graphic limitation: its obligations would be
applied only to persons seeking asylum from
Europe, without obligation with regard to non-
European refugees. Given the anti-Communist
policy of the country during the Cold War per-
iod, this meant that Turkey granted refugee
status only to people coming from Eastern Eur-
ope and the former Soviet Union. Also given
the strong commitment of the West to resettle
those fleeing communist persecution, Turkey
also expected to serve only as a transit country
for the refugees.
Until recently the number of asylum seek-
ers and refugees into Turkey was very small
and sporadic, restricted to Eastern European
cases; and those who were accepted as refugees
were usually encouraged to resettle in the West-
ern countries. According to UNCHR statistics,
there were less than 8,000 asylum seekers com-
ing to Turkey from Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union in the period 1945–1991, nearly
half of them arriving in the years from 1979–
1991. There was no clear indication what pro-
portion of these asylum seekers was actually
accepted as refugees, but it is highly likely
that vast majority of them left Turkey for a
third country.
Since the 1980s, Turkey has found itself in
a situation where thousands of asylum seekers,
mostly from the Middle East but partly from
some distant parts of Asia and Africa, are
entering the country. Having no special regu-
lations regarding the status of non-European
asylum seekers, Turkey has responded in using
its general laws on foreigners coming into the
country. Accordingly, Turkey has expected that
incoming foreigners must possess a valid docu-
 UNESCO 2000.
ment, and must leave the country within the
permitted period of stay. At the same time, on
the basis of variousde facto refugee develop-
ments, the Turkish authorities, applying a cer-
tain degree of pragmatism and flexibility, have
enabled asylum seekers to enjoy some form of
protection. Within this context, large number of
Iranians escaping from the Khomeini’s regime
have been able to enter and stay in Turkey
without an appropriate travel document and resi-
dence permit.
The first mass arrivals of non-Convention
categories of refugees to Turkey, who might
also be considered as transients, were Iranians.
After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, thousands
of Iranians, some arriving with valid documents
but others without, sought refuge in Turkey, but
the majority had the intention of using Turkey
as a transit area to pass to Western countries.
Under current regulations in Turkey, these Irani-
ans have not been recognised as asylum seekers
in the sense of the Geneva Convention, and
have been allowed to stay on as tourists for
time periods that are regularly extended.
Only a small proportion of Iranians have
chosen to use the channels of the UNHCR to
resettle in a third country, while the majority
have tended to find ways to the West using their
own connections. There is no direct evidence on
the actual number of Iranians who have entered
Turkey, but it is widely pronounced that almost
one million Iranians have used the country as
a transit. It is estimated that a residual one or
two hundred thousand are still in Turkey.
Turkey’s second largest flow of transit
migrants was made up of three mass arrivals
from Iraq between the years 1988 and 1991.
The first came in 1988 when the Iran–Iraq War
ended. Pushed by Iraqi military actions more
than 50,000 Kurdishpeshmergas(guerrillas)
and their family members poured into Turkey
in the last week of August 1988. It was again
because of Turkey’s geographical limitation in
the Geneva Convention that the arriving people
from Iraq were considered as ‘temporary guests’
rather than asylum seekers, and were expected
to leave Turkey as soon as possible. Since Tur-
key was against the idea of granting refugee
status to these Iraqi Kurds, the UNHCR was
not allowed to approach them to give assistance
and protection. Thepeshmergasand their famil-
ies were housed in temporary shelter centres
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Street scene from the old quarter of Istanbul, 1996. Antoine Agoudjian / Rapho
 UNESCO 2000.
362 Ahmet Içduygu
close to the Iraqi border, and encouraged to go
home or seek refuge in the West rather than to
stay in Turkey. In fact, a survey showed that
26,873 among 27,028 interviewed Iraqi Kurds
living in the shelter centres intended to resettle
in the West (Kirisci 1994, 52). However, West-
ern countries were reluctant to accept them and
wanted to keep the refugees in Turkey. At the
same time, Western officials were quite critical
about Turkey’s treatment of these refugees,
referring particularly to the quantity and quality
of housing facilities and humanitarian assistance
provided. On the other hand, when the West
showed reluctance to accept any refugees for
resettlement, the Turkish government was criti-
cal of the lack of Western interest in sharing
responsibilities towards refugees.
Due to this conflict between the Turkish
authorities and the West, only a few asylum-
seeking Kurds left Turkey from 1988 to early
1991. As from April 1991, however, a large
proportion of the people from the 1988 influx
joined their compatriots who had fled to Turkey
in the mass exodus of early April 1991, and
returned to the safe zone in the Northern Iraq.
The voluntary repatriation of 1988 arrivals con-
tinued until recently. At the same time, nearly
2,500 of the total 50,000 left Turkey for Iran
and Syria, and only around 3,000 were accepted
as refugees, and resettled in the West.
The second flow from Iraq consisted of
foreign workers in Iraq or Kuwait wanting to
escape from those countries during the Gulf
Crisis. Nearly 60,000 foreign workers and their
dependants, mostly from developing countries
in Asia, fled to Turkey across the Iraq border
in the period between August 1990 and April
1991. These people were temporarily housed at
a camp close to Iraq–Turkish border, and they
left Turkey soon after their arrival when the
necessary transportation arrangements were
made by their national governments or inter-
national agencies.
The last mass flow of people from Iraq to
Turkey occurred when half a million Kurds,
running away from the Iraqi military, poured
into the mountainous region separating Turkey
from Iraq in early April 1991. After the difficult
experience of the 1988 influx, Turkey was keen
not to open her border to this mass flow, but
it was difficult to control. However, compared
with the 1988 experience, the international com-
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munity responded rapidly. Firstly, drawing the
attention of the developed world to the huge
dimension of the movement, Turkey pushed the
West for a massive international humanitarian
programme to meet the food and shelter needs
of the arriving people. Secondly, advocating the
i ea of creating a safe zone in Northern Iraq,
Turkey initiated a voluntary and safe repatri-
ation programme. Consequently, half a million
Kurdish refugees were brought down from
mountain tops in Turkey to the plains on the
Iraqi side of the border.
Despite the fact that a large proportion of
a rivals from Iraq left Turkey, these mass Iraqi
flows not only left a residual population in Tur-
key but also led to further immigration from
Iraq into Turkey. Although the movement was
mainly Kurdish, there were many Arabs, Chal-
deans, and Turcomans also entering Turkey. For
instance, in the period between the late 1980s
and early 1991 there were almost 8,000 Iraqi
asylum seekers who were mainly Arabs, Chal-
deans, and Turcomans. Among these 8,000,
almost half found their way to the West and
resettled there, while the other half stayed in
Turkey with residence permits.
In addition to other incoming migratory
flows, 1989 was characterised by the movement
of more than 310,000 Bulgarian Turkish asylum
seekers fleeing the repressive regime of Bulga-
ria. Later, more than half of these refugees
returned to their homeland. Only a very small
proportion of them managed to go to other
third countries.
Apart from the Middle Eastern flows from
Iran and Iraq, there was a significant movement
of asylum-seekers and other transit migrants
from Africa and Asia to Turkey. Although there
are no complete and reliable figures on the
volume of this movement, it is recorded that
from 1983 to 1991 there were 380 asylum seek-
ers from African countries such as Ethiopia,
Ghana, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan; and 940
from Asian countries such as Afghanistan,
China and Sri Lanka. It can be argued however
that the total number of asylum-seekers from
Asia and Africa is significantly higher than
these figures suggest. A large proportion of the
arrivals from Asia and Africa were undocu-
mented migrants who entered Turkey illegally
and wished to leave it illegally. It is estimated
that in the mid-1990s there were respectively
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2,000 and 750 transit migrants from Africa and
Asia in Turkey. In the late 1990s, the figures
were more than 5,000 for Africans and over
1,000 for Asians. Overall, since the late 1980s,
more than 30,000 transit migrants have arrived
from African and Asian countries such as
Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sudan,
Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.
One of the more recent groups of transit
migrants to Turkey came from Bosnia. The first
flow of Bosnian refugees began to arrive in late
1992. While some of these people held former
Yugoslav passports and entered as tourists, most
of them entered without any documents. The
vast majority of the Bosnian Muslims who came
to Turkey stayed with relatives and other Turk-
ish citizens of Bosnian ethnic descent, and a
significant proportion of them intended to
resettle in the West. Although there are no exact
figures on how many Bosnians came to Turkey,
some reliable sources put the figure as 20,000
to 25,000. While more than three-quarters of
Bosnians returned to their homeland, only a
small proportion, nearly 2,000, stayed with rela-
tives and friends in Turkey. Many Bosnians
who came to Turkey with the intention of
migrating to the West obtained refugee status
in Western countries—the estimated figure is
around 5,000.
The most recent group of transit migrants
to Turkey was made up of Albanian refugees
from Kosovo. Approximately 20,000 Albanians
sought refuge in Turkey in 1999. The majority
of these were considering it as a country of
temporary asylum. Indeed, later a vast majority
of them left Turkey for their homes, only about
1,000 are still living in Turkey.
Finally, here one should mention the move-
ment of trader-tourists from the former Soviet
Bloc countries. Although they can not be con-
sidered as transit migrants, they often become
an integral part of the transit flows as they
move in and out of the countries surrounding
Turkey. The number of people in this category
increased significantly in the 1990s. In this dec-
ade, the total number of visitors from these
countries, the majority of whom were trader-
tourists, rose dramatically: from less than
600,000 in 1989 to nearly 3,000,000 in 1999.
 UNESCO 2000.
Transit migrants in Turkey5
The 1995 study of Transit Migration in Turkey
(IOM 1995) contains the results of detailed and
systematic interviews with 159 men and women
transit migrants in the two major metropolitan
areas, Istanbul and Ankara. These areas were
chosen mainly because they are representative
of major transit migratory flows both into and
out of Turkey. We summarise the major find-
ings of these interviews.
In 1995 almost three-quarters of the inter-
viewed transit migrants were male. Nearly 70%
of them were aged between 17 and 30, and
only 10% of them were more than 40 years of
age. Three in every five were single. Seventy
per cent were city-born people, and 67% were
with at least a secondary level of education. A
large proportion of the transit migrants (67%)
were either full-time employed or students, but
with a high dissatisfaction related to their jobs
or prospective job opportunities. Almost half of
the sampled migrants indicated that they had
blue-collar jobs in their homeland, and two-
thirds saw their income in the homeland as
average. These results confirm that migration is
elective mostly for young, urban-originated and
educated males with less professional, social
and economic satisfaction. Transit migrants
have tended to migrate as individuals, even if
they are married. The collected data indicated
that only a quarter of them planned or attempted
to bring relatives to Turkey.
The majority of the transit migrants were
from the Middle East. More than one-third were
Iraqi and one-fifth were Iranian. Transit
migrants from Africa constitute another one-
fifth of the respondents while those from Bosnia
were 10%, and those from Asia were only 6%.
Ethnic Turks, of which the majority were Tur-
comans coming from Iraq, constitute one-fifth
of the sample, while another one-fifth were of
various African origins. The third major ethnic
group of migrants were Persians who form 14%
of the sample. Ethnic Kurds, Arabs and Bosni-
ans were represented by 9% each.
More than a half of the migrants referred
to the ‘political push’ factors that brought them
to Turkey. The push factors most often men-
tioned were armed conflict, ethnic intolerance,
religious fundamentalism, and political tension.
Economic motives, cited by over one-third of
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the respondents, were also of primary signifi-
cance. Interviewed transients from Iran, Iraq and
Bosnia often stressed the political reasons for
migrating, while Africans and other Asians gave
mainly economically oriented concerns.
Less than 60% of these transit migrants
had been in Turkey for less than one year,
while more than 10% were in the country for
more than four years. The mean duration of
residence for Iranians was almost four years,
whereas for Iraqis, Bosnians and Africans they
were 26, 21 and 13 months respectively. At the
time of the interview, only 8% of the respon-
dents wanted to stay in Turkey. Seventy-one
per cent had previously attempted to leave Tur-
key, but were not successful in their efforts;
and 92% were still planning to do so. The
survey data indicate that transit migration is a
very long process. The migration process from
homeland to final destination through Turkey
seems to take four years on the average: the
average migrant said that he/she planned their
move to Turkey for about a year, had been
living in Turkey for almost two years, and was
planning to leave for the country of final desti-
nation in another year.
Transit migration is very costly too. The
total cost of migration is calculated as the cost
of travelling from homeland to Turkey plus the
cost of travelling from Turkey to the final desti-
nation. The estimated total cost of transit
migration through Turkey was US$3,700. A
large portion of this amount was for bribing.
For instance, in order to pass to Turkey nearly
50% of the respondents had to pay bribes at
their homeland or at the border of a country
neighbouring Turkey; and the average bribe
paid before entering Turkey was US$430, with
a maximum US$3,000 and a minimum of US$5.
Thirty-seven per cent had to pay bribes in Tur-
key and the average bribe paid on the Turkish
side of border was US$270, again with a
maximum US$3,000 and a minimum of US$5.
Twenty-five per cent of the respondents were
planning to pay an average bribe of US$2,400
in Turkey and 12% were planning to pay an
average bribe of US$4,500 at their final desti-
nations. The range of expected bribery for the
travel between Turkey and the final destination
was wide from US$100 to US$10,000. The total
cost of migration varies for various nationalities
following different migration routes. For
 UNESCO 2000.
instance, the cost was much lower for Africans
(US$1,950) most of whom travelled hiding
themselves on ships, but was higher for Asians
(US$3,900), who travelled a longer distance.
Two out of every five interviewed transit
migrants entered Turkey without a passport or
another valid travel document. More than two-
thirds of those who entered Turkey without a
valid document were Iraqi citizens with ethnic
identities of Kurd, Chaldean, or Turk. Almost
all of the undocumented migrants who illegally
arrived in Turkey had the help of traffickers
and smugglers. Nearly one in every ten reported
that they planned to enter their final destinations
without a valid document, the majority hoping
to have the help of traffickers and smugglers.
Only 15% of the respondents were planning to
use another country as a transit after leaving
Turkey and before reaching their final desti-
nation. Major transit choices between Turkey
and the destination not only included neighbour-
ing countries such as Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece,
Italy, Romania, Spain, Iran, and Syria, but also
far-away places such as Pakistan and the Philip-
pines. The major target countries for final desti-
nation were Australia, Canada, the United
States, and various European countries. Scandi-
navian countries, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, Italy and Greece were among the
more favourite destination points in Europe.
Africans, the majority of whom were planning
to work as sailors, constituted the group that
had attempted to go to Greece and were still
planning to go there. Almost 80% of the inter-
viewed migrants said that they would have con-
sidered better living standards and job opport-
unities in choosing their final destination, while
nearly 70% stated that political, social and cul-
tural factors were important for their choices.
Sixteen per cent were considering the countries
with relatively loose visa requirements.
Only one-third of the respondents indicated
that they would consider going to their home-
land as an alternative. More than one-third were
determined to migrate and said that they would
not consider their homeland as an alternative
under any circumstance. The remaining one-
third could go back home if certain conditions
were realised. A vast majority (80%) stated that
they would go back home if both economic and
political conditions changed positively. Almost
one in every five mentioned that they would
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consider returning home if they were paid for
their travel expenses. This proportion was 70%
for Africans.
Two-thirds of the sampled transit
migrants answered ‘yes’ when asked whether
they would have left their homeland if they had
known beforehand all the problems they would
have. This proportion was quite uniform acrosss
national and ethnic groups. Ninety-three per
cent of those who said ‘yes’ were determined
to leave Turkey for another country, although
72% of them had not been successful on their
first attempt and 20% were twice unsuccessful.
Concluding remarks
As I argue elsewhere (Ic¸duygu and Keyman
1998), intense processes of globalisation are
forcing us to rethink the state-centric approach
to the question of international migration. The
processes of globalisation have the potential to
make the question of international migration
complex, complicated and multi-dimensional,
whose changing nature cannot be captured
within the limits of the conventional
approaches. For this reason, attention should be
paid to exploring various ways in which the
link between globalisation and politics of inter-
national migration is constructed both spatially
and historically. In this article, I have attempted
to do so by focusing on the case of transit
migration in Turkey as one of the significant
sites at which the effect of globalisation can be
seen clearly.
In conclusion, it is possible to make two
main observations concerning the dynamics and
mechanisms of the recent transit migration flows
in Turkey as they are articulated into the Euro-
pean IMRs.
First, the preceding discussion leaves very
little room for doubt about the existence of
substantial levels of increasing transit migration
flows in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s.
Although direct evidence is lacking for the
present situation, it is plausible to assume that
a similar kind of mobility will also exist in the
2000s—but with some ups and downs. Some
recent figures suggest that Turkey will continue
to experience modest reductions in the transit
migration flows but that the decline will be
neither rapid nor uniform. The pace of change
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will be slower in the context of the failure of
social, political, and economic improvements in
the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, the persist-
ence of migration networks between the poten-
tial migrants and their relatives and friends who
already live abroad and at home, and the ongo-
ing demand for human resources in the receiv-
ing countries. It is obvious that such reasons
may not necessarily keep the migration flows
high. Critical in this regard are the immigration
and asylum policies and practices of the receiv-
ing countries in the developed regions (West
and North) toward emigration and asylum flows
coming from the developing regions (East and
South).
Second, in an international environment
where rigid restrictive policies put limits on
immigration and asylum flows, differential
migratory response to broad-based IMRs would
result in an increasing trend in transit migration
movements. Some clear tendencies in this direc-
tion have already been seen for the last two
decades. For instance, many transit migrants
have entered the peripheral regions surrounding
Europe; transit migration in Turkey is one of
these examples.
Although there are common features, each
migratory movement between Europe and Tur-
key in the 1980s and 1990s is a particular case
with unique aspects of its own. In short, IMRs
remain diverse. They serve particular interests
in the various key actors, i.e. migrants, receiv-
ing countries and sending countries, which
reflect the various mechanisms and dynamics in
the world migration market. There is, therefore,
no single international migration regime
between Europe and Turkey. There are a num-
ber of regimes that overlap and occur as the
outcome of interactions among the migrants,
their homelands and destinations. Accordingly,
transit migration flows in Turkey have formed
their own regime.
What is common to this migration regime
might be summarised at three levels. At one
level, it establishes a balance between the
mobility of individual migrants and the needs
of the international migration market. At a
second level, it organises the relations between
the sending countries and receiving countries,
which compete as centre and periphery. At a
third level, it distributes power between
(sending, transiting, and receiving) countries.
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Research designed to evaluate those levels migration. It is within this context that the study
within a single study is clearly needed. Such a of IMRs and their association with the changing
study will require a synthesis of data and theor- politics of international migration could serve
etical framework that emerges from various as a paradigm for comprehensive elaboration of
research practices in the field of international the ongoing international migratory flows.
Notes
1. See, for instance, IOM (1994a,
1994b, 1995).
2. See, for instance, IOM,
UNHCR, and OSCE (1996).
3. Part of the discussion on the
transit migration flows in Turkey
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Içduygu, A. 1996b. ‘Citizenship at
the Crossroads: Immigration and
the Nation-State’, in E. Kofman and
G. Youngs (eds.),Globalization,
Theory and Practice. London:
Pinter, 150–162.
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